EVER since the euro crisis broke in late 2009 this newspaper has criticised the world’s most powerful woman. We disagreed with Angela Merkel’s needlessly austere medicine: the continent’s recession has been unnecessarily long and brutal as a result. We wanted the chancellor to shrug off her cautious incrementalism and the mantle of her country’s history—and to lead Europe more forcefully. She is largely to blame for the failure to create a full banking union for the euro zone, the first of many institutional changes it still needs. She has refused to lead public opinion, never spelling out to her voters how much Germany is to blame for the euro mess (nor how much its banks have been rescued by its bail-outs). We also worry that she has not done enough at home: in recent years no country in the European Union has made fewer structural reforms, and her energy policies have landed Germany with high subsidies for renewables and high electricity prices.

And yet we believe Mrs Merkel is the right person to lead her country and thus Europe. That is partly because of what she is: the world’s most politically gifted democrat and a far safer bet than her leftist opponents. It is also partly because of what we believe she could still become—the great leader Germany and Europe so desperately needs.


Stick with Mutti
 
 
Politically, few can match Mrs Merkel. As other leaders have soared and dipped (Barack Obama and David Cameron spring to mind) or not taken off at all (poor François Hollande), she has remained both popular and trusted. And do not underestimate her achievement in holding Europe together. Greece has not fallen out of the euro; northern Europeans have paid for bail-outs; Spain and others have made reforms few thought possible; she helped get rid of clowns like Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi. The euro’s survival so far was not inevitable.

The German election campaign has been another episode in Merkelvellianism. She has barely talked about domestic, European or foreign policy, but rather about trust. Her message is that Germany is prospering, unemployment is at a 20-year low and she has handled the euro crisis well—so this is no time for a change. Her party’s steady 40% poll rating suggests that the message is working. She is far more popular than her main opponent, Peer Steinbrück. He is an engaging politician from the liberal wing of the Social Democratic Party who was an excellent finance minister in Mrs Merkel’s 2005-09 grand coalition, and his party has at times suggested braver answers to the euro crisis than Mrs Merkel has.

But the Social Democrats have veered sharply left, with a redistributive manifesto of tax rises on the rich, a new wealth tax and a high minimum wage. The party has become anti-reform, to the extent of largely disowning the Agenda 2010 labour-market reforms made by the previous Social Democratic chancellor, Gerhard Schröder.

 In a straight contest between Mrs Merkel and Mr Steinbrück, she would clearly have our vote. But Germany rules by coalition. Since Mr Steinbrück has no chance of winning with the Greens, his preferred partner, only three outcomes are plausible: Mrs Merkel’s current coalition with the Free Democrats; another grand coalition with the Social Democrats, with Mrs Merkel staying as chancellor; and worst of all, a “red-red-green” coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and the Left party. This last, which Mr Steinbrück rejects but some in his party are tempted by, would be dangerous and unstable.

We favour a continuation of the present coalition. But most Germans prefer another grand coalition. Mrs Merkel herself is comfortable with the idea. The opposition parties control the upper-house Bundesrat, so their consent is already needed for big legislation. Yet a grand coalition would still be a bad outcome. The Social Democrats were bruised by their previous coalition with Mrs Merkel, so would be more recalcitrant. Voters would be pushed towards fringes, including a new anti-euro party, Alternative for Germany, that could well join the Left in parliament. The Free Democrats back economic reform and tax cuts, where a grand coalition would do little.


Angela’s Agenda 2020
 
 
If Mrs Merkel is re-elected, what will she do? There are two reasons to think that she might become a more forceful proponent of reform at home and abroad. The first is that her instincts are generally on that side. In 2005 she put forward some bold ideas for reforms and tax cuts, though the fall in her party’s share of the vote then reinforced her natural caution. In 2009 her enthusiasm was soon crushed by the onset of the euro crisis. But as the crisis fades and growth in Europe picks up, a third-term Merkel, with an eye on her legacy, might push harder to make Europe’s economies more competitive.

The second reason for hope is that her cautious approach increasingly looks the more dangerous option for both Germany and Europe. Complacent Germans may be surprised to be told they need more reform. Yet despite today’s strength their economy has many underlying weaknesses. A mix of poor demography, excessive reliance on exports, low productivity growth and too many low-paid jobs has led the OECD, a rich-country think-tank, to rank Germany joint last, with Luxembourg, in its growth projections for the next 50 years. The service sector should be opened to more competition. Higher education needs an overhaul: Germany has only one university in the world’s leading 50. More investment is required, especially in infrastructure and research and development. Energy prices must be cut. And the public sector needs to become more responsive and productive.

This adds up to a formidable domestic agenda. But in the end Mrs Merkel’s real legacy lies in reshaping the EU. Again her instincts are promising: she wants to build a stronger financial union, to push more liberal policies, to complete the single market, to cut welfare and to trim regulation. She wants to keep Britain in the club, though not at any price. Assuming she wins the chancellorship, she will be Europe’s dominant politician. Our bet is that she will want to be remembered as a decider not a ditherer.